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INTRODUCTION

Since the first airplane was made that was large enough for a person to
walk around in, injuries to passengers from turbulence encounters have
been occurring. Airlines are required to take every reasonable precaution to
prevent these types of injuries to their passengers and, as statistics show,
injuries that result from turbulence are rare.1 However, when a passenger
does suffer an injury from an encounter with bumpy air, who should bear
the cost?
If an airline operates a flight negligently and a passenger is injured as a
result, then the airline should rightfully bear the burden of compensation for
the injuries. This is so particularly when the passenger can point to a specific act the airline performed (or did not perform but should have) that
caused the passenger's injury. But what should be the result when the passenger can not point to a specific act by the airline that was responsible for
their injury?
One accepted theory of negligence is res ipsa loquitur. The theory is
that even though the injured person cannot point to a specific act that
caused his or her injury, the injury they suffered would not have occurred
unless someone, somewhere, was negligent in some form or fashion.2 In
other words, the injury they suffered does not normally occur as the result
of an accident. In the context of a passenger injury due to turbulence, is it
reasonable to assume that injuries due to turbulence do not occur unless an
airline is negligent in some form?
In the history of aviation, courts routinely held that res ipsa loquitur
was not an appropriate method for finding negligence for passenger injuries.4 It was understood that airlines could not be expected to account for
every bump and bounce an airplane may encounter while in flight. 5 However, technological advances in the past half century have rapidly improved
the industry's ability to predict when and where turbulence will occur, and
to mitigate the effects of turbulence encounters when they do occur.

1.

NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ANNUAL REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA;

U.S. AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 2004, at 16 (2004) (noting that between
1994 and 2004 there was an average of only ten serious injuries on FAR Part 121 (large
airline) carriers per year attributed to turbulence).
Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Mo. 1953).
2.
3. Id.
4.
Frank D. Cimino, Air Turbulence Liability, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 1163, 1163-64
(1999).
5. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 667; see also Robert A. McClarty,
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline PassengerLitigation, 37 VA. L. REv. 55, 72-74 (1951) (noting
that airlines are not generally in exclusive control of turbulence encounters).
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This Comment will discuss the wisdom of applying a res ipsa loquitur
theory of negligence for injuries to passengers due to encounters with turbulence. First will be a discussion of the multiple ways an air carrier aircraft
may encounter turbulence and the meteorological events that give rise to
turbulent air. Advances in technology that allow airlines to predict where
turbulence will occur, and avoid it if possible, will also be given consideration. Background on the fundamentals of a res ipsa loquitur argument will
be addressed along with the manner in which turbulence injuries are currently dealt with by the courts. The argument will then be advanced that
courts should alter their current analysis of turbulence injuries to include res
ipsa loquitur followed by counter arguments to that idea.
The Comment concludes that, in spite of significant advances in predicting and avoiding turbulence, res ipsa loquitur is still not a theory of negligence that should be routinely allowed in passenger turbulence injuries.
Turbulence is an inevitable effect of air travel that cannot always be predicted or from which passengers cannot always be protected by an airline.
Therefore it is difficult to meet the elements required for the theory of res
ipsa loquitur to apply.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

METEOROLOGY OF TURBULENT AIR

An understanding of some fundamentals of turbulence is necessary in
analyzing whether commercial airlines should be held to any particular legal standard pertaining to injuries that result from turbulence encounters.
Anyone who has flown is familiar with turbulence to one degree or another.
Turbulence varies in severity from a minor ripple of light turbulence as an
airplane passes a wisp of cloud on one end of the scale, to a gut-wrenching,
panic-inducing, violent, shaking encounter with severe turbulence resulting
from thunderstorm penetration or clear air turbulence at the other end.6
For the purposes of conceptualizing how turbulence affects aircraft, a
comparison with water is helpful.7 Water and air are both fluid and, to a
large degree, react similarly when disturbed. When a flowing river is inter6. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION
MANUAL, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO BASIC FLIGHT INFORMATION AND ATC PROCEDURES, ch. 7, § 123 (2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/air traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/chap7toc.htm
[hereinafter AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION

MANUAL]

(dividing turbulence into four separate

categories of light, moderate, severe, and extreme, and giving examples of what the aircraft
and passengers might expect in each category).

Scott McCartney, Airline Passenger Injuries from Turbulence Decline,
http://www.post3,
2005,
May
POST-GAZETTE,
gazette.com/pg/05123/498351 .stm.
7.

PITTSBURGH
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rupted by a rock, it is easy to see the pools and eddies that occur downstream of the rock. The faster the water is moving, the greater the disturbance and the farther downstream the flow of water is affected. Similarly,
as air passes over a building or tree, the flow is disturbed and that disturbance will be felt by an aircraft as turbulence. On a larger scale, mountains
can disturb airflow that has an effect tens of thousands of feet in altitude
and hundreds of miles downwind of the mountains.8 As a boat moves
through water it leaves a wake behind it, and the larger or faster the boat,
the greater the wake it trails. Airplanes moving through the air also disturb
the medium as they move through it and it takes little convincing to see that
a super-jumbo jet will have a greater disturbing effect on the air than a
light, single-engine aircraft. Since aircraft operate within a fluid environment, a disruption of that fluid is required for turbulence to occur. How and
to what degree the fluid environment is disrupted will dictate the effect on
the aircraft and passengers.
1.

Thunderstorms

The fact that thunderstorms are capable of producing significant turbulence is easy to understand for anyone who has been caught outdoors as a
summer storm blew through. A thunderstorm is a "mass of very unstable air
in violent motion up, down, and sideways." 9 There are multiple hazards
associated with thunderstorms such as lightning, hail, tornadoes, and heavy
rain.' 0 But what really bothers passengers about thunderstorms is the turbulence.1 1 Unless one is attempting to land or takeoff from an airport where a
thunderstorm is located, most hazards they present can be avoided by flying
around the storm.1 2 Although avoiding thunderstorms is a primary concern
vicinity of thunderstorms has great potential
for aviators, just flying in the
3
encounters.'
air
turbulent
for
Before the development of airborne weather radar, 14 pilots relied on
vague forecasts, eyesight, experience, and a good bit of luck to successfully
navigate through and around thunderstorms. Forecasts were often inaccurate and, if flying in the clouds, it was impossible to avoid a storm and its
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

See discussion on Clear Air Turbulence infra Part II.A.3.
ROBERT N. BUCK, WEATHER FLYING 164 (1978).

Id. at 165-69.
Id.at 165.
See discussion on Wind Shear infra Part II.A.2.

FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC 00-6A
13.
AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL, at 114 (1975), avail-

able at http://www.faa.gov/Regulatory_andGuidanceLibrary/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf
[hereinafter AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS].
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1181 (4th ed. 2001) (stating that
14.
radar is an acronym for Radio Detecting and Ranging).
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turbulence visually. Weather radar became commonplace on commercial
jets in the 1960s and with it the ability to "see" into the clouds and detect
the location of rain, thunderstorms, and, by association, turbulence.
Radar energy reflects off of water molecules and the more water present in a cloud, the stronger the return to the sending unit located in the
airplane. 5 The more intense concentrations of water are in the strongest
part of a storm. 16 With radar, pilots could now detect where the rain was
heaviest and, through experience in using and interpreting airborne radar
returns, could avoid those areas. Combined with research that determined
where turbulence was located in relation to the water concentration in a
thunderstorm, the industry learned that if the heaviest rain was avoided, the
strongest turbulence was also avoided.' 7
While all thunderstorms are indicative of turbulent air, there is no direct correlation between the outer visual appearance of thunderstorms and
the level of turbulence they may contain. 18 Very strong storms can reach
upwards of 50,000 feet into the atmosphere;' 9 well into, and occasionally
above, the altitudes used by modem passenger jets. 23 The presence at those
altitudes of strong jet stream winds has the potential to carry turbulent air
produced by a thunderstorm hundreds of miles from the present location of
the storm.2 1 Avoiding the downwind side of a thunderstorm by one mile for
every knot 22 of wind at altitude will go a long way to smoothing out the ride
and avoiding the turbulence associated with the storm.23 With jet stream
winds in excess of 100 knots not unusual, it may be a long deviation around
the storm, but it may be a smooth one as well. Additionally, storms often
develop in long lines along frontal systems making it difficult to circumnavigate a storm and avoid its turbulent effects.24 While avoiding the storm
may be desirable, avoiding the distant effects of the turbulence it creates
may be difficult or impossible.
The development and advancement of weather radar for aircraft has
played a large role in allowing pilots to avoid turbulent air associated with
15.

16.
24B

17.

AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS, supra note 13, at 120.

Id.

FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC 00-

THUNDERSTORMS

§

6

(1983),

available

http://www.faa.gov/Regulatory_andGuidance Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf.

at

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 3-1.
BUCK, supra note 9, at 175.
AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS, supra note 13, at 111.
BUCK, supra note 9, at 184.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1252 (1981) (defining a knot as "one

23.
24.

BUCK, supra note 9, at 184.
AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS, supra note 13, at 114.

nautical mile per hour used as a unit of measurement in expressing the rate of speed of...
airplanes and in expressing the relative strength ... and degree of intensity of air currents").
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thunderstorms by avoiding the storms altogether. This is particularly true in
cruising flight where the availability of vast amounts of airspace makes
avoiding thunderstorms a viable option. The same is not true when the
thunderstorm is located near an airport or in congested airspace, such as the
northeastern United States. The only option then is to wait until the thunderstorm moves away from the airport or navigate in the vicinity of the
thunderstorm to the extent it can be done safely. But this presents its own
set of hazards and turbulence problems, most notably wind shear.
2.

Wind Shear

Wind shear, very simply, is a rapid change of wind velocity over a
relatively short distance. 25 Any change in velocity or speed, regardless of
the magnitude, can be classified as a shear of the wind. In that respect it can
be encountered anywhere within the atmosphere. For that reason, it is necessary to narrow the type of wind shear by type and intensity to discern how
it relates to possible turbulence injuries.
There are many different types of wind shear from the benign to the
truly violent and hazardous. Benign wind shear is encountered every day by
aircraft all over the world and includes minor interruptions in the wind flow
caused by buildings, hills, trees, and ocean breezes to name a few.26 These
shears create minor deviations in the flight path and are easily accommodated by the pilot and the aircraft. A more hazardous wind shear known as a
micro burst is associated with thunderstorms.27 This more hazardous wind
shear, which creates large changes to airspeed and vertical velocity, is categorized as severe wind shear.28
The term "severe wind shear" is used to describe a very dangerous
type of wind shear.29 It is defined as an increase in vertical velocity of 500
30
feet per minute or greater, or an airspeed change of fifteen or more knots.
A severe wind shear encountered more than a few thousand feet above the
ground is not a problem as there is sufficient time and altitude to recover
the lost lift or airspeed. It is when a severe wind shear is encountered close
25.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 00-54
PILOT WIND SHEAR GUIDE 2 (Nov. 25, 1988) [hereinafter WIND SHEAR ADVISORY
CIRCULAR]; see also Kenneth R. Hardy, Wind Shear and Clear Air Turbulence, 42 J. AIR L.

& CoM. 165 (1976).
26.
WIND SHEAR ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supra note 25, at 2.
27.
Id.
28. UNITED AIRLINES, FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL, ch. 31, § 10.14 (June 1, 2007)
[hereinafter UNITED AIRLINES FOM]; see also WIND SHEAR ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supra note
25, at 44. The author gratefully acknowledges United Airlines' permission to use portions of
this confidential company document. Permission is on file with the author.
29. WIND SHEAR ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supranote 25, at 2.
30. UNITED ARLINES FOM, supra note 28, ch. 31, § 10.14.
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to the ground that is most dangerous. During takeoff or landing, where the
speed of the aircraft is already low and there is little altitude to spare, the
pilot must be most concerned about a severe wind shear encounter.3' In
fact, if at all possible, the Wind Shear Advisory Circular advises pilots to
avoid areas of known microburst wind shear altogether.3 2
A microburst is a strong downdraft of cool air created by a thunderstorm as a result of the down rush of the rain shaft through the cloud.33 The
downdraft reaches the ground and disperses laterally around the thunderstorm and the strength of the downdraft is a function of the size of the
storm.34 It is not unusual for the lateral speed of the wind to reach upwards
of fifty miles per hour as it exits the storm, and the average speed is around
forty-five knots. 35 An aircraft unintentionally entering a microburst can
expect airspeed changes equivalent to the wind speed. For an aircraft configured for landing and at a slow speed, the loss of additional speed resulting from the microburst encounter may reduce its airspeed below a point at
which it can fly. 36 The Wind Shear Advisory Circular points out that a fifty
knot wind speed change is the maximum most air carrier aircraft can escape
and it is entirely possible for a wind shear to be of sufficient velocity that
escape is impossible.37
Microburst activity has the capacity to create significant turbulence
due to the strength of the downdrafts and the sudden shifts in the wind
component that occur from the vertical to the horizontal.38 Since turbulence
encountered by an aircraft due to microburst occurs low to the ground while
passengers are seated with seatbelts fastened, there are relatively few turbulence injuries as a result. However, wind shear is germane to the discussion
as an excellent example of how technology has advanced in wind shear and
turbulence detection. Through detection, avoidance is possible, and if it is
possible to avoid turbulence, prevention of turbulence injuries is the result.
3.

ClearAir Turbulence

If the broad principle of wind shear as a change in direction or speed
of the wind is applied over a larger area, the conditions required to create

at 44.

31.

BUCK, supra note 9, at 131; WIND SHEAR ADVISORY

CIRCULAR,

supra note 25,

32.
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-26; WIND
SHEAR ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supra note 25, at 14.
33.
WIND SHEAR ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supranote 25, at 8.
34.
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-26(a).

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. § 1-26(d)(2).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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clear air turbulence are present. Clear air turbulence is exactly what it
sounds like, turbulence that occurs in clear air absent any clouds or visible
generating agent. 39 Although different forms of turbulence may occur in
clear air, as discussed here, clear air turbulence is the phenomenon created
by relatively sharp turns in high altitude, fast moving streams of air, known
as "jet streams. '' O As is the case with wind in general, jet streams are the
result of differential pressure systems. 41 They flow from west to east in the
northern hemisphere and east to west in the southern hemisphere and are
often the motivating force behind weather systems.4 2 Jet streams over the
United States tend to be strongest in winter as a result of very cold high
pressure systems descending from polar regions.43
Just as a curving river has more eddies and swirls than a straight
stretch of water, a jet stream with more curves and bends will generate significant turbulence as a result.44 Because the jet streams are not marked by
any particular cloud patterns, the locations of bends and turbulence are impossible to determine visually with any great accuracy. 45 However, it is
possible to predict in a broad area where turbulence associated with jet
streams may occur.4 6
4.

Wake Turbulence

All aircraft create a rotating vortex 47 from the wingtip as a byproduct
of lift production. 48 The larger the aircraft, the stronger the vortex,4 9 and
large commercial aircraft create sufficiently powerful vortices to cause aircraft following in their trail to be upset. 50 The wake created takes the form
of a vortex that trails behind the producing aircraft and creates a strong rotating force.
39.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 00-30B
ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE AVOIDANCE para. 4a (Sept. 9, 1997), available at
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatoryand GuidanceLibrary/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/2b397ebd29
693934862569ba00688e85/$F1LE/ATTL5WYK/ACOO-30B.pdf [hereinafter ATMOSPHERIC
TURBULENCE ADVISORY CIRCULAR].

40.
41.
42.

BUCK, supra note 9, at 122.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 122.

44.
45.

BUCK, supra note 9, at 124.
Id.at 123.

43.

ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE ADVISORY CIRCULAR,

supra note 39, para. 5a(1).

supra note 39, para. 5e.
supra note 6, ch. 7, § 3-2 (describing a
vortex as a swirling air mass trailing downstream from the wingtip of the aircraft producing
it and trailing and sinking behind the aircraft).
48. Id.
49. Id.at ch. 7, § 3-3.
50.
Id.
46.
47.

ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE ADVISORY CIRCULAR,
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL,
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")\

Fig. 7-3-1 Wake Vortex Generation.5'
This is a particularly dangerous situation when aircraft follow the precise flight path of a preceding larger plane; it occurs most frequently on
takeoff and landing at larger airports where there is a continuous flow of
many differently-sized aircraft. There have been a number of accidents attributed to smaller aircraft encountering the wake of a larger airplane, the
rotational force of which is so great that the smaller aircraft is unable to
maintain control.5 2 Approach-and-landing wake turbulence encounters,
while creating a hazard for the encountering airplane, have a relatively low
risk of creating turbulence-related passenger injuries as a result of the encounter. Similar to wind shear encounters, passengers are normally seated
with seatbelts fastened when a low altitude wake turbulence event occurs.
There is a second encounter with wake turbulence that is much more
insidious and difficult to avoid. It occurs at cruise altitudes and is much
more likely to produce turbulence injuries because the encounter happens
when the seat belt sign is routinely off. An encounter at cruise altitude with
another aircraft's wake has been compared to encountering moderate clear
air turbulence.53
There are many areas of the world where aircraft follow the same
flight path; a "highway in the sky." Where automobiles operate in two dimensions, aircraft operate in three and it is possible, even likely, that two
aircraft will be on the same route of flight at different altitudes. The possibility presents itself that a following aircraft will fly into the descending
wake of a preceding aircraft travelling on the same route at a higher altitude. Wake vortices are normally invisible and therefore difficult or impos51.
Id. at ch. 7, § 3-2, fig. 7-3-1.
52.
Bruce Landsberg, Wake Turbulence: Should You Worry?, AOPA PILOT, Oct.
1988, at 160, available at http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/sp9810.html (indentify'ig
fifty-six accidents attributable to wake turbulence in the sixteen years prior to the article's
date of publication).

53.

AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL,

supra note 6, ch. 4, § 6-7.
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sible to detect or avoid visually.5 4 These unanticipated and usually undetectable encounters with wake turbulence create a real hazard for passengers and flight crews who are up and about in the cabin.
B.

ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY AND PROCEDURES THAT AFFECT THE
LIABILITY ANALYSIS

How have advances in technology, procedures, and knowledge increased an airline's ability to predict when and where turbulence will occur? In order for res ipsa loquitur to apply as a theory for finding an airline
negligent in a turbulence-related injury, the airline would have to have
complete knowledge of when and where turbulence is going to occur. 55
With this complete knowledge, the airline would be expected to have the
seatbelt sign on and passengers secured with seatbelts fastened prior to encountering the bumpy air. The following section will address some specific
areas where advances have significantly increased airlines' ability to determine the existence of turbulence and, thus, to reduce or eliminate their exposure to passenger claims of negligence related to turbulence injuries.
1.

Strategic Lateral Offset Procedures

One ironic outcome of advances in navigational accuracy is an increased threat of encountering a head-on collision or wake turbulence along
predefined routes of flight.56 Prior to the use of Global Positioning Systems

(GPS) and gyro-stabilized Internal Navigation Systems, aircraft navigated
by use of ground-based radio beams. 7 This worked well until the flight
included a route that traversed oceans or extremely remote land areas where
54.
The vortices themselves are not visible, but jets at high altitude often create
contrails. The contrail is the white exhaust plume visible from the ground as a white streak
across the sky following a jet. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 316 (4th ed.
2001). It is moisture content from the engine exhaust freezing in the -54'C ambient air. Id.
The contrail is often subjected to the rolling effect of the wingtip vortex and thus the vortex
takes on a visual component. The vortex does not always follow the contrail and a visible
contrail is only present in specific meteorological conditions. WW2010 University of Illinois, http://ww2OlO.atmos.uiuc.edu/(Gh)/guides/mtr/cld/cldtyp/oth/cntrl.rxml (last visited
Apr. 26, 2010) (noting that relatively high ambient humidity is required for contrails to form,
otherwise the moisture content of the jet exhaust evaporates into the atmosphere before a
contrail can form). Thus, it is occasionally possible to avoid vortices at altitude by avoiding
a preceding jet's contrail, but this is by no means guaranteed to avoid the wake.
55.
See discussion on res ipsa loquitur infra Part II.C. 1.
56. INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., NORTH ATLANTIC MNPS AIRSPACE OPERATIONS
MANUAL § 8.5.1 (European & N. Atl. Office of ICAO ed. 2008), available at
http://www.nat-pco.org/nat/vINPSA/MNPSA_2008.pdf [hereinafter ICAO].
57.
Roger Mola, The Evolution of Airway Lights and Electronic Navigation Aids,
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/GovemmentRole/navigation/POL 13.htm
(last
visited Apr. 26, 2010).
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there was no radio coverage. The navigation systems used over these areas
with no radio coverage had inherent inaccuracies that could position two
aircraft on the same route but at different altitudes anywhere from several
feet to several miles apart. There was an unintended element of safety in
these early navigation systems because the inherent imprecision made the
potential for collision between two aircraft on the same route of flight mistakenly assigned to the same altitude unlikely. Less importantly overall, but
pertinent to this Comment, the navigation error also made the likelihood of
encountering a preceding aircraft's wake turbulence much more unlikely
because it was very doubtful that the two aircraft would be positioned one
directly on top of the other.
Modem navigation systems utilize internal gyroscopes and/or GPS,
which have accuracy to within several feet regardless of where in the world
the aircraft is or how long it has been out of range of ground based radios.
The irony arises because the increase in navigational accuracy also increases the chance of collision if two aircraft, flying in opposite directions
on the same route, are inadvertently assigned to the same altitude.58 In addition, it increases the chance of encountering the wake of a preceding aircraft and the turbulence associated with it. The collision hazard is only present to this degree in remote areas inaccessible by ground based air traffic
control radar. Where air traffic control radar is present, controllers receive
timely warnings of aircraft at co-altitudes where a collision hazard exists.59
In response to this increased-albeit remote-likelihood of collision, the
International Civil Aviation Organization developed the Strategic Lateral
Offset Procedure (SLOP) to be used in remote areas of the world where
separation of aircraft by air traffic control radar is not available. This is a
procedure where aircraft transiting remote airspace are required to fly a
fixed distance from the centerline of an airway to add an additional level of
safety against collisions and turbulence.6 ° SLOP requires any aircraft flying
in remote areas to fly either one or two miles to the right of the true center
of the route. 61 Two aircraft flying towards each other at the same altitude,
who are both offset one mile to the right respectively, would avoid each
other by two miles. While two aircraft assigned to the same altitude would
only occur as the result of an error by air traffic control or a flight crew, it

58.
59.

ICAO, supra note 56, § 8.5.1.
Id.

60.

FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OCEANIC ERRORS SAFETY

BULLETIN 01-09, at 5 (2009), availableat http://www.faa.gov/pilots/intl/oceanic_ops.
61.
ICAO, supra note 56, § 8.5.3(b); see also UNITED AiRLrNEs FOM, supra note
28, ch. 9, § 60.2 (endorsing use of offset procedures in all oceanic, polar, and South American flights).
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does occasionally happen and the SLOP program provides an additional
level of safety for all involved.62
SLOP has the added benefit of allowing aircraft on the same route,
traveling in the same direction, to move laterally so as not to be directly
underneath a preceding aircraft, thus preventing flight through the preceding aircraft's wake. This is indeed one of the prescribed uses for the procedure.63 This relatively new procedure has increased the ability of pilots to
avoid the wake of preceding aircraft and adds to the argument that turbulence injuries are avoidable. 64
2.

Wind Shear Detectionand Avoidance

Between 1964 and 1985, twenty-six airline accidents were attributed
to wind shear resulting in 620 deaths and over 200 injuries.65 Avoiding
wind shear has been a safety priority for airlines since the danger was recognized and understood in the early 1980s. 66 Shortly thereafter, research

developed a system that was installed on aircraft and warned pilots that they
had flown into a wind shear situation. While this was helpful in recognizing
the danger early enough to apply remedial action and protect the passengers
and aircraft, a more desirable solution was to avoid the wind shear altogether, making remedial action unnecessary.67 An ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure.
Avoiding the wind shear required knowing where the wind shear was
located. To that end, several systems were developed which achieved that
result. Low Level Wind Shear Alert System (LLWAS) is a series of highly
accurate anemometers 68 placed strategically around an airport that warn

62.
ICAO, supra note 56, § 8.5.1.
63.
Id. § 8.5.3(d).
64. AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 4, § 6-7 (noting that
offsets of approximately one wingspan can move a following aircraft out of the immediate
vicinity of the preceding aircraft's wake).
65.
Roger Allan, Making the Skies Safer, ELECTRONIC DESIGN, May 24, 2004,
available at http://electronicdesign.com/Issues/IssueID/262/262.html; see also WIND SHEAR
ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supra note 25, at 1.
66. Angela Rozas, The Kenner Crash, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 7,
2002, at Al (noting a series of accidents in the late 1970s and early to mid 1980s were attributed to wind shear that resulted in public and political pressure to develop answers to the
wind shear detection and avoidance problem).
67.
Id.
68.
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 53 (4th ed. 2001) (defining
anemometer as a gauge for determining the force or speed of the wind, and sometimes the
direction).
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69
controllers when dangerous wind shifts were occurring. Controllers could
then warn pilots who could make the necessary decisions to avoid the wind
shear or minimize the danger. A second ground-based system offered even
more precision in isolating the location of dangerous wind shear and microbursts near an airport. Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) was able
to recognize and quantify the horizontal wind component of a microburst
near an airport and provide controllers and pilots warning of its existence.7 °
LLWAS and TDWR are very effective in reducing wind shear encounters at airports where they are installed, but they are expensive to install and
are only located at airports where the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has determined it is cost effective to do so. 7 1 A wind shear detection
and avoidance capability for each individual aircraft would provide the
most comprehensive safety increase as each aircraft could predict where
wind shear is located in relation to its flight path and not rely on individual
airport based systems. This advance was realized when a new airborne
technology arrived in the early 1990s that takes advantage of the ability of
pre-existing aircraft weather radar to monitor the same horizontal aspect of
rain as TDWR by scanning the flight path up to ten miles ahead of the aircraft. 72 In fact, the Federal Aviation Regulations now require all airline-type
aircraft to have this Predictive Wind Shear technology installed.7 3
The Predictive Wind Shear system operates at low altitude during approach or takeoff and has great benefit in assessing the danger to an aircraft
in the landing or takeoff phase of flight. The Predictive Wind Shear is in
constant operation on takeoff and landing and, if it senses a wind shear
event in the immediate flight path, a warning is sounded up to sixty seconds
in advance of the encounter giving the pilots precious extra seconds to take
precautionary action prior to encountering the wind shear.
The primary goal in wind shear prediction and avoidance is to prevent
fatalities; however, a secondary benefit accrues to an airline from the technological advances in this area, the elimination of encounters with turbulence.

69.

Rozas, supra note 66, at Al; see also AERONAUTICAL

INFORMATION MANUAL,

supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-26 (providing an in depth explanation of the placement of LLWAS
sensors and how they present warnings of wind shear to air traffic controllers).
70.
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-26.
71.
Id.
72.
Allan, supra note 65.
73.
14 C.F.R § 121.358 (2008) (requiring all transport aircraft manufactured after
January 2, 1991 to include some type of wind shear detection or avoidance system and also
requiring aircraft manufactured prior to Janaury 3, 1991 to be retrofitted with the technology).
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Advances in Radar Technology

Improvements in radar, both groundbased and airborne, have played a
significant role in improving the aviation industry's ability to detect turbulence. Radar is simply a radio wave reflected off an object like rain or an
aircraft.7 4 The amount of radio energy reflected back to the radar receiver
lets an operator interpret speed or direction of the object and, in the case of
precipitation, the amount of precipitation. 75 Depending on the required use,
the radar can be tuned for different purposes such as air traffic control or
weather detection. 6
In the late twentieth century, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration began installation of a new system of weather-depicting
radar known as next generation radar or NEXRAD.7 7 This radar was much
more capable than previous radar and allowed meteorologists the ability to
depict all weather, including thunderstorms, in much greater detail than was
previously possible.78 With the improved resolution of thunderstorms,
weather forecasters were able to predict which thunderstorms were likely to
produce damaging winds and tornadoes.7 9
The main benefit of NEXRAD was to the general public, but a peripheral benefit was derived by the aviation community. With the ability to
view thunderstorms with greater detail, the aviation industry had a better
method of detecting dangerous turbulence. This was beneficial in the forecasting phase of flight planning, but by the time a flight departed and was
near the areas of thunderstorms, the situation would very likely have completely changed.
The early twenty-first century has brought about an additional technological advancement that takes the NEXRAD advancement one step further
by making the NEXRAD radar returns available in the cockpit of an airplane in real time.80 The ability to link streams of data to radio frequencies
(similar to a wireless computer network) allows pilots to view ground based
radar in real time on a screen in the aircraft.8 ' Now NEXRAD is not just a
prediction of where turbulence containing thunderstorms might be located,
74. AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-14(a).
75.
AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS, supra note 13, at 120.
76. See AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-14 (discussing generally the principle that air traffic control radar is principally used for separation of
aircraft and secondarily to assist aircraft in avoiding weather that it may have a limited ability to display).
77.
WSICorp.,
The
History
of
Weather
Radar,
http://sysul.wsicorp.com/unidata/intro.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80. AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-1 1(a).
81.
Id.
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it is a tool to avoid known areas of thunderstorms altogether. Although
NEXRAD is not a replacement for an aircraft's airborne weather radar,
used in conjunction with it, the two offer an excellent means to avoid thunderstorms and, in the process, turbulence.
Weather avoidance radar installed on aircraft has likewise seen improvements in capability, but it has only been required equipment in transport aircraft since the 1960s. 82 A 1950 case discussing the causes for an
airline crash mention the fact that "neither [defendant airline] nor any other
American airline had airborne radar in operational use in... 1948." 83 While
some airlines did have airborne weather radar at the time, it was a relatively
new device and in its infancy. 84 The weather radar being used presently
would show a vastly different picture than would have been available then.
The radar used then would have depicted precipitation in shades of
gray, similar to a black and white television, with the darker shades indicating heavier rainfall. It would have required a high level of expertise and
training to properly interpret. 85 Early onboard radar would have required
one pilot's almost undivided attention to operate, effectively removing him
or her from assisting in flying the aircraft. 86 Modem radar uses sophisticated algorithms to interpret the radar energy being returned and presents it
to the modem pilot in a distinct multi-color display with individual colors
representing different rainfall gradients. 8' The modem radar is more intuitive to interpret and it is also more obvious at a glance as to where the lightest area of rainfall is located. The lighter areas of rainfall would help to
indicate where any turbulence would be the least significant.88
Modem radar also has some limited ability to detect turbulence. Although what the radar is displaying is not turbulence, it does reflect condi-

82.
14 C.F.R. § 121.357 (2008) (requiring that, after December, 31, 1964, all transport category aircraft have airborne weather radar installed and it must be operational when
thunderstorms are predicted along the route of flight).
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 129 (6th Cir. 1955);
83.
see also E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963); Cudney v. Midcontinent
Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Mo. 1953).
Nw. Airlines, 224 F.2d at 124-30 (discussing the court's failure to find in the
84.
record any evidence that satisfactory airborne radar equipment was commercially available
at the time the case was decided noting that at the time it was "unreliable and unsatisfactory").
85.
Id.at 129 (discussing the difficulty of screen brightness and the complete attention of one pilot to operate early test versions of radar).
Id.
86.
87.
Jerome Greer Chandler, The Better to See You With, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD,
Mar. 2007, at 61.
88.
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-31.
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tions most likely to contain turbulence. 89 As discussed previously, 90 emitted
radar energy reflects back to the aircraft from moisture in the atmosphere in
the form of rain, snow, or hail. Where that moisture is moving in a horizontal motion (as opposed to vertical), the radar interprets that horizontal motion as indicative of turbulence and presents that to the pilot's radar display
as a different color return from that of vertical moisture. 9' In this way, radar
has some ability to show the pilot where turbulence is likely to be present.
Aircraft onboard radar has an effective range of approximately one
hundred fifty miles, which, at cruise speeds of five hundred miles per hour,
only allows pilots to assess the weather conditions up to fifteen minutes
ahead of the airplane. This range gives the pilot the ability to avoid thunderstorms that are in the flight path, but not the ability to plan a flight path that
avoids areas of thunderstorms altogether. The ability to receive updated
weather information, such as through NEXRAD, allows the pilots to assess
entire continents if necessary and avoid large areas of unstable weather and
the associated rough air.
4.

Air CarrierApproach and Policy Reducing Turbulence Encounters

Commercial airlines have a vested interest in reducing injuries to passengers. Not only is it the right thing to do, but it has the potential to save
significant amounts of money in reduced costs from suits by injured passengers, lost time by injured employees, and aircraft maintenance costs
associated with turbulence encounters.9 2 There are a number of methods
airlines employ to minimize turbulence encounters and minimize injuries
when turbulence is encountered.
Meteorological forecasting of turbulence locations is slowly improving, giving airlines the ability to plan flights that avoid the worst of the turbulence. 93 Northwest Airlines has long been known for its aggressive turbulence forecasting and sells its forecasting to other airlines as well. 94 Airlines
are also able to model wind patterns over mountainous areas that are likely
to be turbulent and avoid these areas when conditions are ripe to create turbulence.
89.

FED. AVIATION ADMwI.,

94.

McCartney, supra note 7.

U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSP., THUNDERSTORMs-DON'T

(1997),
available
at
www.avhf.com/html/Publications/FAA/brochures/Thunderstorms.pdf.
90.
See discussion of radar, supra Part II.A. 1.
91.
Chandler, supra note 87, at 61.
92.
Press Release, Univ. Corp. for Atmospheric Research, NCAR Teams With
United Airlines To Pinpoint Turbulence In Clouds: Research Can Help Reduce Delays,
Injuries, Costs (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2007/turbulence.shtml.
93.
Peter N. Spotts, Detecting Turbulence That No One Can See, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Dec. 31,1997, at 1.
FLIRT'EM

SKIRT'EM
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When conditions do not warrant rerouting the flight or it is impossible
to route the flight around known or potential turbulence, the airline's dispatchers will warn the pilots of that potential. With that advance warning,
pilots will be on their guard for the development of turbulence ahead and be
able to take precautionary measures to protect passengers and crewmembers.
Airlines have a strong interest in keeping passengers buckled in their
seats as much as possible because almost all turbulence injuries can be
avoided when passengers are securely fastened to the airplane. 95 The desire
to keep passengers in their seats must be balanced against the passengers'
need and desire to be up and about in the aircraft. Current Federal Aviation
Regulations require that the seatbelt sign be on for all taxi, takeoff, and
landing operations.96 Most airlines tend to expand on this requirement and
keep the seatbelt sign illuminated until the flight has reached its cruising
altitude.97 Some also turn the sign on at the beginning of the descent portion
of the flight when approaching the destination. 98 In addition, the Federal
Aviation Regulations require a small placard be visible at every seat, stating, "Fasten Seat Belt While Seated." 99
In the interest of protecting passengers and crewmembers from injury,
one airline policy requires the captain of the flight to turn on the seat belt
sign if any turbulence greater than light °0 is encountered. 0 1 That same policy then requires flight attendants to verify that all passengers have in fact
fastened their seat belts.' In the event the turbulence rises to the level of
moderate,10 3 the airline policy is for the passengers and the flight attendants
95.
Kathy Barnstoff, Smoothing Out the Skies, NASA, Aug. 30, 2004,
http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/improvingflight/tpaws.html.
96.
14 C.F.R. § 121.317(b) (2008) ("[Tlhe 'Fasten Seat Belt' sign shall be turned on
during any movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing ... ").
97.
Joel Cox, Five Simple Tips to Seatbelts on Airlines, ASSOCIATED CONTENT,
Aug.
14,
2007,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/347629/fivesimple tipsto_seatbelts on airlines.
html?cat=2. The author's own professional opinion is that it is generally good practice to
wait until the aircraft is above approximately 25,000 feet when current conditions can be
assessed and air traffic control can be queried as to current turbulence reports before considering turning off the seat belt sign.
98.
Id.
99.
14 C.F.R. § 121.317(d) (2008) ("No person may operate a passenger-carrying
airplane under this part unless at least one legible sign or placard that reads 'Fasten Seat Belt
While Seated' is visible from each passenger seat.").
100.
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-23(b) (defining
light turbulence as "[t]urbulence that momentarily causes slight, erratic changes in altitude
and/or attitude").
101.
UNITED AIRLINEs FOM, supra note 28, ch. 31 § 10.12.
102.
Id.
103.
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 6, ch. 7, § 1-23(b) (defining
moderate turbulence as "[t]urbulence that is similar to [1]ight [tiurbulence but of greater
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to be seated with their seat belts fastened.1 4 In this way, the airline protects
the passengers by having them seated when turbulence is expected or encountered.
C.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR

1.

The Basic Elements of Res Ipsa Loquitur

In any negligence action a plaintiff must be able to present evidence of
some specific act by the defendant that was the cause of his or her injury. 0 5
If the plaintiff cannot point to a specific act by the defendant that caused the
injury, but the type of injury the plaintiff suffered does not normally occur
unless negligence was present, then the plaintiff may argue res ipsa loquitur06 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a theory of negligence that relies
on the inference that the harm complained of does not happen in the absence of the negligence of another party. 0 7 The basic elements necessary to
allow a jury to consider res ipsa loquitur are as follows: first, that the accident was of a kind that does not usually occur absent negligence; second,
that the instrumentality that caused the accident was in the exclusive control
of the person charged with the negligence; and third, that the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary act on the part of the plaintiff.'0 8
In addition, some jurisdictions require the defendant possessed superior
knowledge as to the cause of the occurrence.' 0 9
The use of the Latin phrase "res ipsa loquitur" is the popular way to
refer to the concept but tends to confuse the issue. 1 0 Considering its English translation of "the thing speaks for itself' is useful in understanding the
concept. In the context of this Comment, the premise is that a passenger's
injury as a result of an encounter with turbulence could not have occurred
without negligence on the part of the airline. The circumstances surrounding the injury would, therefore be sufficient for a jury to conclude that the
airline was negligent in not requiring passengers to be seated and secured
with a seatbelt.
In cases where the circumstantial evidence is allowed to be considered
as evidence of the defendant's negligence, courts may require that a plainintensity. Changes in altitude and/or attitude occur but the aircraft remains in positive control
at all times").
UNITED AmLiNES FOM, supra note 28, ch. 31, § 10.12.
104.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
105.
Id. § 328D cmt. a.
106.
Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Mo. 1953); see
107.
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
108.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
109.
Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 666.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965).
110.
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tiff has no proof of any acts of specific negligence by the defendant."'
Where a jury is allowed to use their common knowledge and the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's injury to infer the liability of the defendant,
the burden may then shift to the defendant to show that he or she was not
explanation for the plaintiff's
liable or that there is some other plausible
12
injuries other than their negligence."
Jurisdictions vary in their application of res ipsa loquitur. Some will
allow a jury to consider the defendant's negligence under a theory of res
ipsa loquitur along with evidence of specific negligence.' 1 3 The opposite
approach is to not allow consideration of res ipsa loquitur if there is any
evidence of specific acts of negligence."14 In Gafford v. Trans-Texas Airways," 5 the plaintiff appealed a trial court decision in favor of Trans-Texas
in which five separate instances of specific negligence by the airline were
alleged that resulted in plaintiff's injury."16 The trial judge, applying Tennessee state law, refused to allow the jury to consider res ipsa loquitur as a
theory of negligence and the appellate court upheld the jury instruction stating, "[t]here is no rule that res ipsa loquitur applies generally to accidents
occurring in airplanes while in flight.""' 7 Similarly, New York law holds
that res ipsa loquitur allows an inference of negligence but the inference is
not allowed if there is other evidence of negligence. "18
In jurisdictions that allow res ipsa loquitur and specific negligence,
these two approaches effectively give the jury two avenues to find negligence on the part of an airline. A jury may find specific negligence if sufficient facts are present to show the airline breached its duty to the passenger

111.
MidcontinentAirlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 666 (denying the jury instructions to
consider res ipsa loquitur and remanding the case to allow the defendant to allege specific
negligence).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. h, m (1965). This shifting of the
112.
burden is particularly applicable where, as in the case of air carriers, a defendant has a special duty to the plaintiff. Id.; see also discussion of air carrier highest duty of care, supraPart
ll.D.1.
Gafford v. Trans-Tex. Airways, 299 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1962); see also People v.
113.
Morris, 377 N.E.2d 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (allowing plaintiff to proceed on alternative
theories of res ipsa loquitur and specific negligence); McGuire v. Stein's Gift & Garden Ctr.,
Inc., 504 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) ("Specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur may
be pled in alternative; evidence tending to show specific acts of negligence will not automatically foreclose dependence on [res ipsa loquitur] doctrine.").
114.
Gafford, 299 F.2d at 61.
115.
Id.at 60.
116.
Id.at61.
117.
Id.
118.
Sanchez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 436 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
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or, alternatively, that the circumstances surrounding the injury are sufficient
to infer that the carrier was negligent. 1 9
In Kelly v. American Airlines Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that it is the difficulty in proving that the accident would not have
occurred in the ordinary course of events without negligence by the defendant that most courts cite as the reason they decline to invoke the principle.' 20 It seems equally likely that the second element-that the instrument
that caused the injury be in complete control of the defendant-is difficult
to prove as well. If turbulence has buffeted an aircraft to the point that a
passenger has been injured, it is arguable that the airline does not have exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury. Either the aircraft caused the injury and the airline has momentarily lost control of the
aircraft, or the atmosphere has caused the injury and the airline never had
control of the atmosphere.
Is it the airplane that caused the injury or the atmosphere surrounding
the airplane? If the airplane is the culprit, then it would be fairly easy to
show that the airline and its agents-flight attendants and pilots-were in
complete control of the airplane. If the atmosphere is the cause of the turbulence, however, it becomes more difficult. The airline would now be required to have complete knowledge of when and where turbulence will
occur in order to ensure the complete safety of the passengers. Their safety
would be ensured by requiring that passengers be seated with their seat
belts fastened anytime the airplane transited an area where the airline knew,
or should have known, turbulence was present. Unfortunately for passengers, no such complete knowledge is yet available.
One particularly well put explanation of res ipsa loquitur offered by
Justice Holmes states:
"Res ipsa loquitur," . . . is merely a short way of saying
that, so far as the court can see, the jury, from their experience as men of the world, may be warranted in thinking
that an accident of this particular kind commonly does not
happen except in consequence of negligence, and that
therefore there is a presumption of fact, in the absence of
explanation or other evidence which the jury believe, that it
happened in consequence of negligence in this case. 2 '

119.
A.L.R. 4th
120.
121.

Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Accidents, 25
1237 § 2[a] (1983).
Kelly v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 508 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1975).
Graham v. Badger, 41 N.E. 61, 61 (Mass. 1895).
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Res Ipsa Loquitur Applied to Early Aviation Cases

In the formative years of aviation, it was considered common knowledge that aviation accidents did happen without the fault of the pilot.' 22 The
base of knowledge of airplane crashes and experience with its hazards in
these early years was too shallow for courts to consider that the accidents
were the result of negligence of some type. 23 In the 1950s and 1960s as
airline travel became a mainstream form of travel, technology and human
factors dramatically improved the safety of flight. It became commonplace
for courts to recognize res ipsa loquitur in crash cases-as opposed to turbulence injuries-because airplanes
no longer fell from the sky without
14
point.
some
at
involved
negligence
Even though res ipsa loquitur was not uncommon in crash cases, it was
still rarely applied in the area of passenger turbulence injuries that are the
result of unexpected lurches or bumps.'25 There is no rule that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies to aviation-related injuries or accidents as it is a
fact specific analysis and, as in any negligence case, whether res ipsa loquitur applies depends on the facts of each case and not that an injury was
caused by turbulence. 26 With rare exceptions, courts have refused to apply
res ipsa loquitur to injuries caused by instability in flight 127 because it was
not reasonable to expect a constant state of stability in flight. 28 Generally,
the fact that turbulence injuries are the result of unstable air makes it difficult for a defendant to fulfill the first required element of res ipsa loquitur.129 It is "common knowledge

. . .

that downdrafts

mon" and due to no negligence of the airline. 3 0

..

are not uncom-

D.

CURRENT ANALYSIS OF TURBULENCE INJURIES

1.

Duty, Breach, Causation,Harm-The StandardNegligence Analysis

As discussed previously, since res ipsa loquitur is routinely denied to
plaintiffs attempting to retrieve damages for injuries suffered as a result of
122.
Kruk, supra note 119, § 2[a], at 1242-43.
123.
WILL1AM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 216 (4th ed. 1971); see
also Kruk, supra note 119, § 2[a], at 1242-43.
124.
PROSSER, supra note 123, at 126.
125.
Id.
126.
Gafford v. Trans-Tex. Airways, 299 F.2d 60, 61 (6th Cir. 1962); Kruk, supra
note 119, § 2[a] at 1245.
Kruk, supranote 119, § 2[a], at 1245.
127.
128.
Lazarus v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 292 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
129.
Kelly v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 508 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1975).
130.
Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Mo. 1953) (quoting Small v. Transcon. & W. Air, Inc. 216 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)).
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turbulence, they are then left with the burden of showing the airline was
negligent and breached a duty owed to the passenger. This is a more traditional negligence analysis of proving the carrier had a duty to the passenger,
that the carrier failed in that duty, that the failure of the duty was the proximate cause of harm to the passenger, and that the passenger suffered some
compensable injury. 3 '
While most negligence actions require a "reasonable" standard of care,
common carriers are held to the "highest degree of care."' 132 Since airlines
hold themselves out for public transportation, they are known as common
carriers. 133 Thus, they must exercise the "highest degree of care" with respect to their passengers, operation, maintenance, and adjustment of the
parts. 34 It is important to understand that despite this higher duty of care,
35
an airline is not required to absolutely insure the safety of its passengers.
An injury to a passenger is not compensable unless it was foreseeable or
could have been reasonably anticipated. 36 "[W]here the means or precautions ... of avoiding the hazard of dangerous turbulence are known or are
pointed out in the evidence to have been available, . . . the failure' 37to take
such specific commensurate precaution. . . constitutes negligence."'
A plaintiff claiming injury due to the negligence of another has the
duty of showing that the defendant was negligent, and this burden of proof
must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. 38 That is, a jury must
find it more likely than not that 139
the negligence of the defendant was the
cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
Some jurisdictions may restrict the use of res ipsa loquitur when allegations of specific negligence are made by a plaintiff.1 40 If a plaintiff has
evidence of a specific act of negligence, then he or she may be prevented
from requesting that the jury consider the negligence of the carrier in the
larger abstract sense that the circumstances speak for themselves and the
associated inference of negligence. 14' This has the effect of requiring the
131.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (listing the traditional
elements of a negligence claim).
132.
Raube v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1035 (N.D. Il1. 2008)
(mem.) (quoting Katamay v. Chi. Transit Auth., 289 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ill. 1972)).
133.
Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 665.
134.
E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1963).
135.
Raube, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (quoting Gaines v. Chi. Transit Auth., 804
N.E.2d 653,656 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)); Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 665.
136.
Raube, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
137.
Cudney v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 412, 417 (Mo. 1957).
Id.
138.
139.
Id.
140.
Kruk, supra note 119, § 2[b], at 1246; see also MidcontinentAirlines, Inc., 254
S.W.2d at 666.
141.
Gafford v. Trans-Tex. Airways, 299 F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1962).
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defense to prove up any instances of specific negligence if possible, rather
than relying on res ipsa loquitur and circumstantial evidence to prove its
allegations
case.142 Other jurisdictions will allow the jury to consider 1both
43
simultaneously.
loquitur
ipsa
res
and
negligence
of specific
2.

Assumption of Risk and ContributoryNegligence

In comparison to the number of flights flown annually, the number of
turbulence injuries to passengers is relatively small.'" On average, fiftyeight airline passengers are hurt in turbulence incidents in the United States
each year and ninety-eight percent of those injuries happen because people
do not have their seat belts fastened. 45 Given the rarity of passenger injuries, airlines appear to be doing a good job of fulfilling their higher duty of
care to do all they can to prevent passenger injuries due to turbulence.
However, what is the result if, in spite of the best efforts of the airline, passengers choose to leave their seats when the seat belt sign is on and the
flight crew expects that all passengers are safely buckled to the airplane?
To some degree, passengers operate under an assumption of the risk of
injury if they choose to leave their seat when the seat belt sign is on. For an
assumption of risk defense to be available to the airline, a passenger would
be required to have "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently assumed the
risk of danger, or that the danger was so obvious that [the passenger] must
be taken to have done so. ' ' 146 Whether or not a passenger has sufficient
knowledge of the dangers of turbulence to intelligently assume the risk of
injury when the seat belt sign is on is a fact specific analysis for a jury to
determine.
Given the ubiquitous nature of air travel today and the emphasis
placed on keeping passengers' seat belts fastened anytime they are
seated,147 it is arguable that the danger of injury is so obvious to any rea142.
See Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 667 (denying the jury the ability
to consider res ipsa loquitur and remanding the case to allow the defendant to allege specific
negligence).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. m (1965).
143.
McCartney, supra note 7 (noting that in 2004 no passengers were injured front
144.
turbulence on domestic flights).
145.
Kathy Bamstorff, Smoothing out the Skies, NASA, Aug. 30, 2004,
http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/improvingflight/tpaws.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
146.
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 125 (6th Cir. 1955)
(citing Morris v. Cleveland Hockey Club, Inc., 105 N.E.2d 419, 426 (Ohio 1952)).
147.
Federal Aviation Regulations require a small sign to be visible to each passenger stating "Fasten Seat Belt While Seated," and airline policy requires flight attendants to
instruct passengers who leave their seat when the seat belt sign is on to return to their seat.
14 C.F.R. § 121.317(d) (2009). Flight attendants will not physically restrict passengers who
ignore the seat belt sign, but passengers will be under no illusion that it is safe to be unbuckled and out of their seat. Id.
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sonable traveler that they did assume the risk of injury. The existence of a
website dedicated to turbulence forecasting is solid evidence that turbulence
is a fairly well known occurrence by travelers. 148 "Furthermore, a passenger
on a common carrier is required to exercise reasonable care for his or her
own safety and is chargeable with knowledge of conditions which his or her
senses record. ' 1 49 Additionally, in some jurisdictions, one element to apply
res ipsa150loquitur is that the plaintiff did not contribute to his or her own
injury.
III.
A.

ARGUMENTS

ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY HAVE PLACED AIR CARRIERS IN A MUCH
BETTER POSITION TO PREVENT TURBULENCE INJURIES

As discussed previously in Part II, one element that must be met for a
jury to consider whether res ipsa loquitur applies is that the defendant must
have been in control of the instrumentality that caused the injury.15' If res
ipsa loquitur requires that a turbulence injury would not have occurred
without negligence on the part of the airline, it will be necessary to show
that the airline was in control of every aspect of the situation and could
have prevented the injury from occurring. The airline, and specifically the
pilot, must possess complete knowledge of where and when turbulence
would occur. With this knowledge, he or she could either avoid the turbulence altogether or turn on the seat belt sign and require passengers and
flight attendants to be seated as the flight transited the bumpy air, thus preventing injury. The advances in technology, better understanding of meteorology, and improved operational procedures for dealing with turbulence
that would assist a pilot with achieving this complete knowledge were discussed in a previous section. 152 This section will present several previously
decided cases and apply modem technology updates to a hypothetical
analysis of the facts to argue that with current technology, res ipsa loquitur
would be the appropriate standard if the case occurred today.
In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, Mrs. Silber was thrown from her
seat and injured her back when the flight on which she and her husband
were traveling flew in the vicinity of a thunderstorm. 53 The facts of the
case state that the flight was at least five miles from the storm when the
148. See Turbulence Forecast, http://www.turbulenceforecast.com (last visited Apr.
26, 2010).
149. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1963).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. i (1965).
151.
152.
153.

Id. cmt. g; see discussion supra Part H.C. 1.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
Silber, 324 F.2d at 39.
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turbulence was encountered, but the pilots did not turn on the seat belt sign,
nor were they using the aircraft's weather radar to circumnavigate the
storm.' 54 In Silber, a jury found the airline liable for Mrs. Silber's injuries
due to negligent operation of its aircraft, because it did not fulfill its duty to
exercise the "highest degree of care. 1 55 Current regulations and airline policy would have prevented the type of injury Mrs. Silber incurred, because
the airline would have had control of the factors that led to her injury.
At the time of the Silber incident, air-carrier aircraft were not required
have
weather radar onboard. Silber was decided in 1963 and although the
to
exact date of Mrs. Silber's injury is not included in the facts of the case, the
injury must have occurred at some point prior to the decision. It was not
until 1964 that the Federal Aviation Regulations required passengerto have radar onboard that was capable of detecting thuncarrying airlines
56
derstorms. 1
Current airline policy would not allow a pilot to operate in the vicinity
of thunderstorms without using the weather radar. 5 7 In Silber, the pilots
failed to use the radar onboard the aircraft in spite of flying in the vicinity
of a thunderstorm. 58 Major airlines would require their pilots to use radar
anytime they are operating in an area where thunderstorms are likely. 5 9 The
Federal Aviation Regulations, while requiring air carrier aircraft to have
situation.' 60 It
radar installed, do not require it to be used in any specific
6'
only need be installed and functional, but not operating.'
Regardless of company policy or federal regulation, any professional
pilot would be committing professional suicide by operating a modem jet
aircraft in the vicinity of a thunderstorm without using the radar. This is so
because an additional federal regulation prohibits operation of an aircraft in
a reckless manner. 62 This is a catch-all regulation and has been used by the

Id.
154.
Id.
155.
156.
14 C.F.R. § 121.357(a) (2009) ("No person may operate any transport category
airplane ... certificated after December 31, 1964, unless approved airborne weather radar
equipment has been installed in the airplane.").
UNITED AiRLINEs FOM, supra note 28, ch. 31 § 10.2.
157.
Silber, 324 F.2d at 39.
158.
UNITED AiRLINES FOM, supra note 28, ch. 31 § 10.2.
159.
14 C.F.R. § 121.357(a) (2008).
160.
Id. § 121.357(c)(1) ("No person may dispatch an airplane... under 1FR or night
161.
VFR conditions when current weather reports indicate that thunderstorms, or other potentially hazardous weather conditions that can be detected with airborne weather radar, may
reasonably be expected along the route to be flown, unless the airborne weather radar
equipment is in satisfactoryoperatingcondition." (emphasis added)).
14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2008) ('No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
162.
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.").
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63
FAA in enforcement actions against pilots in a variety of creative ways.1
Any pilot who did not operate onboard weather radar when flying in the
vicinity of a thunderstorm may subject himself or herself to a reckless operation charge in violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations with a resulting suspension or revocation of their license to operate aircraft.' 4
Airline operating policy and general professional knowledge also require a specific distance to be flown from a thunderstorm.165 As a rule-ofthumb, remaining twenty miles from a thunderstorm being displayed on
the distance may vary
radar is considered good operating practice although
66
depending on altitude and outside temperature.
Similar to the radar, the Federal Aviation Regulations require that aircraft be equipped with seat belt signs 167 but leave the specifics of when they
must be illuminated, at least to some degree, to the pilot. The regulations
require the seat belt signs to be on during taxi, takeoff, and landing, but do
not specifically require the seat belt sign to be on during turbulence. 168 A
requirement for the seat belt sign to be on during turbulence would be
found in the general allowance that it be turned on at "any other time considered necessary by the pilot in command.', 169 Airline operating policy
would be more specific and require that the seat belt sign be illuminated
anytime turbulence is encountered or expected. 7 ° The FAA prohibition on
reckless operations discussed above would have effect here also and it is

See, e.g., Ferguson v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 678 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.
163.
1982) (holding that landing at the wrong airport constituted careless and reckless operation);
United States v. Newman, 331 F. Supp. 1240, 1240 (D.C. Haw. 1971) (holding that operating an aircraft where it was known that the aileron trim tab switch was operating in reverse
violated federal aviation regulations prohibiting anyone from operating aircraft in careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger life or property of another).
164.
14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2008); see also J. ScoTr HAMILTON, PRACTICAL AVIATION
LAW 31 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing types and manner of FAA enforcement actions).
165.
BUCK, supra note 9, at 183; see also UNITED AIRLINES FOM, supra note 28, ch.
31 § 10.3.
166.
BUCK, supra note 9, at 183; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC 00-24B THUNDERSTORMS, § 7 (1983); see also NCAR Teams With
United Airlines To Pinpoint Turbulence In Clouds: Research Can Help Reduce Delays,
Injuries, Costs, http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2007/turbulence.shtml

26, 2010).

(last visited Apr.

167.
14 C.F.R. § 121.317(a) (2008) ("[N]o person may operate an airplane unless it
is equipped with passenger information signs that meet the requirements of § 25.791 [defin-

ing seat belt sign requirements] of this chapter.").

Id. § 121.317(b) ("[T]he 'Fasten Seat Belt' sign shall be turned on during any
168.
movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing ... .
169.
Id.
170.
UNITED AIRLINES FOM, supra note 28, ch. 31 § 10.11 (dictating that the seat
belt sign be on and a public address announcement be made anytime turbulence is expected).
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reasonable to speculate that a pilot may face violation for reckless operation
71
if he or she knowingly flies through turbulence with the seat belt sign off.'
Were the facts of the Silber case presented today, it is certainly arguable that, but for the negligence of the airline, Mrs. Silber's injury would
not have occurred. 7 2 Regulations now require the use of radar on aircraft. 73
Under current professional standards and knowledge of thunderstorms and
their associated turbulence, it would be reckless for the pilot to leave the
seat belt sign off when operating within five miles of a thunderstorm. And
finally, airline policy would require that the seat belt sign be on, and that
the pilots maintain a substantially greater distance from a thunderstorm than
was the case in Silber. This is a very direct example of modernization of
regulations and policies providing an increase in the safety of flight. These
rules and policies provide the airline with complete control of the turbulence encountered in Silber and, in this instance, provide airlines a method
to avoid turbulence and any related injuries.
All of the elements of res ipsa loquitur would be met. The airline
would have knowledge that thunderstorms were forecast to be present in the
planned area of flight. Federal regulations would require the aircraft to be
equipped with radar, and the pilots would have been able to avoid the thunderstorms, or at least identify the specific location of the storms. 17 4 Airline
policy would require the seat belt signs to be on and passengers seated
while in the vicinity of the storm. A jury, therefore, should be able to infer
negligence on the part of the airline based on the facts present, and it would
be proper for a court to allow them to consider res ipsa loquitur as to the
airline's negligence.
Another case to which this analysis can be applied is Cudney v. Braniff
Airways, Inc. 175 Mrs. Cudney was thrown from her seat when the flight
inadvertently flew into the downdraft of a thunderstorm en route from Kansas City to Omaha. 176 She subsequently sued, claiming the airline was negligent for, among other things, "flying the airplane into a storm when [the
pilots] should have deviated the course of the plane so as to avoid the storm
and downdraft."' 177 The trial court set aside a jury verdict for Mrs. Cudney
See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2008).
171.
E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).
172.
173.
14 C.F.R. § 121.357(a) (2008). The fact that radar is now mandated by administrative regulation may be enough in itself to prove negligence on the part of the airline. See
PROSSER, supra note 123, at 193 ("When a statute provides that under certain circumstances
particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as fixing a standard for all
members of the community, from which it is negligence to deviate.").
174.
See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2008).
300 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1957).
175.
176.
Id. at 413.
177.
Id.
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and she appealed the decision. 178 The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately
overturned the trial court and reinstated the jury verdict holding that the
jury was reasonable in finding the airline
negligent for failing to circum79
navigate the known hazard of a storm. 1
It would be interesting to know whether the facts in Cudney would be
sufficient for a present day court to allow the jury to consider res ipsa loquitur because Cudney's predecessor case, Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines,
Inc., is the pre-eminent discussion on res ipsa loquitur as it applies to air
turbulence injuries.' 80 Mrs. Cudney's case was brought before the Missouri
Supreme Court on appeal after a jury found for the airline. 8 ' Mrs. Cudney's appeal argued that the court was in error for not instructing the jury
that they could consider the negligence of the airline on the theory of res
ipsa loquitur 82 The Missouri Supreme Court eventually held that res ipsa
loquitur was not appropriate because it was common knowledge that turbulence during an airline flight was not unusual. 83 The case was remanded to
allow Mrs. Cudney to amend her complaint to include allegations of specific negligence. 184 The retrial eventually made its way
back to the Missouri
85
Supreme Court in Cudney v. BraniffAirways, Inc.'
An analysis of the Cudney facts would parallel the discussion above in
Silber in that modem equipment would have made Mrs. Cudney's injuries
avoidable. Modem forecasting and ground radar would give the pilots adequate foresight of the storm's presence. The modem equipment installed on
the aircraft would provide the pilots the ability to detect the storms ahead
and avoid them altogether. Certainly as it relates to injuries caused by thunderstorms, it seems plausible that, but for the airlines negligence, injuries
due to turbulence near thunderstorms do not occur.
B.

THE ANALYSIS OF NEGLIGENCE HAS BEEN EVOLVING WITH THE
MATURATION OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY AND THE ANALYSIS
SHOULD NOW INCLUDE RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Has the point arrived where the information available to the aviation
industry, coupled with advanced technology and procedures, relegated turbulence injuries to the realm of predictability so that they warrant consideration of res ipsa loquitur as a theory of negligence? The tort sage William
Prosser discusses an apt analogy in the development of negligence analysis
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. at 418.
See 254 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1953).
Id. at 663.
See id.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Cudney v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1957).
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and how it may
shift over time with changing societal expectations and
86
technologies.i
In the early twentieth century the carbonated beverage bottling industry was in its infancy and it was not at all uncommon during this period to
have the occasional bottle explode. 187 Whether this was due to uneven carbonation levels, imperfect glass bottle strength, improper handling or storage, or negligent capping procedures is not known. 188 What is known is that
at the time most courts agreed that the existence of the odd exploding bottle, while unfortunate, was insufficient evidence of negligence to sustain a
verdict against the bottler for liability for the injury under a theory of res
ipsa loquitur. 89 The beverage bottlers did not have sufficient control of all
aspects of the bottling, handling, and delivery process to allow a jury
90 to
infer that any negligence must have occurred on the part of the bottler.'
However, by the mid-twentieth century, improved industry processes,
materials, and procedures had all but eliminated the occurrence of exploding bottles, and it became a very rare event. The legal analysis subsequently
changed by recognizing that the bottling industry had sufficient techniques
and control of the entire process of production, bottling, capping, and distribution to prevent exploding containers. 191 Subsequently, an exploding
bottle was sufficient proof to infer that the bottler was liable for negligence.19 2 The bottler was understood to have sufficient control of the process from production to consumption that a bottle would not explode had the
manufacturer not been negligent at some point in the process. Courts held
that a jury could properly apply their common experience and infer neglipoint of failure of the manugence of the manufacturer even if the specific
193
facturer's duty could not be pinpointed.
Early cases of airline liability for turbulence injuries were treated by
courts in a similar manner to the early exploding bottle cases. 94 The courts
moved slowly until a sufficient body of knowledge and experience was
obtained. The earliest cases of aviation liability were considered cases of
strict liability' 9' because aviation was considered to be an "ultrahazardous

123, at 217.
Dail v. Taylor, 66 S.E. 135, 137 (N.C. 1909).
See id.
189.
PROSSER, supra note 123, at 217.
190.
Id.at 220.
191.
Id. at 217.
192.
Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co., 139 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1958).
Id.; see also Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 247 P.2d 344, 350-51 (Cal. 1952).
193.
PROSSER, supranote 123, at 217.
194.
Henry Grady Gatlin, Jr., Tort Liability in Aircraft Accidents, 4 VAND. L. REV.
195.
857, 860 (1951).
186.

187.
188.

PROSSER, supra note
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that resulted
activity.0 96 Those who practiced it were liable for any damage
97
1
negligence.
or
fault
of
absence
the
in
from flying, even
As late as 1939, when aviation was on the cusp of World War II, the
Restatement of the Law of Torts stated that aviation had not reached such a
stage of safety as to justify treating it by analogy to the railroads.' 98 The
comparison to earlier modes of transportation is pertinent because air travel
was simply the most recent advance in travel, and application of previous
theories of negligence to the provider of transportation was only natural. 199
Railroads had reached a level of maturity that aviation would not reach for
several decades and had a long history of negligence actions brought by
passengers.2 With this long history and predictability of service came a
well-developed negligence analysis that placed the level of care that railroads owed their passengers as the "highest standard of care.,, 20 ' Airline
liability followed a similar path in the progression of liability analysis and
in 1939 the analysis was "developing.. . as it did with railroads more than
half a century [before]. 20 2
In Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court
compared the airlines to another type of common carrier-streetcars and
busses. 20 3 As common carriers, streetcars and busses had gained the reputation over the years that "violent jolts and jerks ...[did] not result except
through negligence, either in the operation or maintenance of the [streetcars
and busses].,, 204 Due to the years of experience with streetcars and busses,
res ipsa loquitur was considered an acceptable theory of negligence when a
passenger was injured from a sudden jerk or jolt while riding on a streetcar
or bus. 20 5 The court ultimately held that current experience with passenger
injuries resulting from jerks or jolts (turbulence) aboard airplanes was insufficient to allow the jury to consider res ipsa loquitur for the airline's negligence.20 6 This analysis, done in 1953, certainly left open the possibility
that at some point in the future there could be sufficient experience with
turbulence injuries that res ipsa loquitur would be an appropriate theory of
196.
197.

PROSSER, supra note 123, at 515.

Id.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 520 cmt. d (1938).
199.
Gatlin, supra note 195, at 860.
See McCartney, supra note 7, at 83-85 (comparing the applicability of res ipsa
200.
loquitur in aviation cases to railroad and sea cases).
PROSSER, supra note 123, at 515.
201.
202.
Small v. Transcon. & W. Air, Inc., 216 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950);
see Gatlin, supra note 195, at 859-63 (discussing the progression of liability for aviation
accidents from the inception of air travel to the time the article was written in 1950).
Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 665-68 (Mo. 1953).
203.
Id.at 666.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 667.
206.
198.
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airline negligence.2 °7 In time, airlines gained the respect and trust of the
public by continuing to improve the safety and reliability of air travel.2 °8 As
the public trust grew, so did the courts' analysis of negligence actions
against airlines. Just as air carriers inherited other aspects of the railroad
industry,20 9 they also inherited the railroads' "highest standard of care" requirement for carriage of their passengers. Airlines have advanced from
strict liability to a negligence analysis requiring the "highest standard of
care" attributable to common carriers.21 °
"A common carrier for hire owes more than a duty of 'reasonable
care' to its passengers; it must exercise 'the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation of its vehicles."' 211 Common carriers are
those airlines that will carry for hire at a uniform price all passengers or
cargo as long as there is room on the aircraft.212 The higher standard of care
is justified by the unique level of control a carrier possesses over its passengers. The theory is that passengers give up virtually all control over their
safety when they choose to travel by air.
The court in Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc. was prescient in
1953 when it commented that it might be possible at some future date to say
"it is the common experience of mankind that commercial airliners do not
lurch and drop for some distance except for negligence in the operation of
the plane. 213 That sentiment was echoed in a 1983 article, noting that "in
the face of once unimaginable technological advances and the commonplace position aviation has assumed in society, res ipsa loquitur is becoming
a more acceptable and successful means of proving an aviation accident
case." 2 14 Perhaps now is the time to again shift the analysis and to urge
more courts to let the jury consider a res ipsa loquitur finding of negligence.
207.
Id.
208.
See Kruk, supra note 119, § 2[a].
209.
Labor unions of airlines are covered under the Railway Labor Act and not the
National Labor Relations Act like most American labor unions. HAMILTON, supra note 164,
at 304, 309. The Railway Labor Act is constructed to prevent unions from striking except as
a last resort in order to maintain the flow of economic goods and passengers. Id. at 309.
When one type of aircraft is substituted for another on a route it is called a "change of
gauge," a phrase adopted from the railroads and the different gauge of tracks used by railroads before standardization of gauge took place. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., FINAL REPORT ON AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERV. COMMITMENT 32 (2001),
http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/av200lO20.pdf.
210.
MidcontinentAirlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 665.
211.
Raube v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(mem.) (quoting Gaines v. Chi. Transit Auth., 804 N.E.2d 653, 656 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)); see
also discussion supra Part II.D.1.
212.
HAMILTON, supra note 164, at 148.
213.
MidcontinentAirlines,Inc., 254 S.W.2d at 667.
Kruk, supra note 119, § 2[a].
214.
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COUNTER ARGUMENTS

MOST TURBULENCE IS STILL CONSIDERED AN "ACT OF GOD" AND NOT
IN THE CONTROL OF A DEFENDANT AIRLINE

The earth has a surface area of approximately 196 million square
miles. 215 Consider also that modem jet aircraft regularly operate from the
surface up to roughly seven miles above the surface. Given these dimensions, the amount of area an airline may be responsible for knowing
weather conditions and where turbulence may be present becomes impressively large. Even discounting the relatively small portion of the globe that
sees little airline traffic,2 16 the area is enormous. Coupled with an average
of 40,000 thunderstorms daily 217 containing turbulence, and dozens of separate jet streams crossing the earth over numerous mountain ranges, the potential for a turbulence encounter is very high. In fact, the flight that experiences absolutely no turbulence at all is either very short or extremely rare.
A comparison was made earlier of the fluid nature of the atmosphere to that
of water.218 The comparison is useful again to conceptualize the difficulty
of predicting and countering airborne turbulence. Rare would be the occasion that the ocean is viewed at a dead calm. Even on a day with fine
weather and benign conditions, there are small waves present and any boat
on the water would experience some small degree of pitch and roll. The
constantly changing effect of wind, currents, tides and pressure systems
makes predicting sea conditions possible in the macro scale but difficult in
the micro scale. The same difficulty is true of air turbulence and the ability
of forecasters to adequately isolate when and where air turbulence will occur.219 The solution may lie in onboard turbulence detection equipment, but
until that Holy Grail is achieved, it will be the common experience of air
travelers that, in spite of the best efforts of airlines and crewmembers, turbulence happens and the occasional injury along with it. In 2006, a flight
attendant suffered serious injury after a flight encountered mountain wave

215.
Steven L. Dutch, Earth, in 6E WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 17, 17 (2009).
216. Antarctica is the only portion of the earth that sees little or no airline traffic.
Flights from the U.S. and Europe to Asia routinely fly over the arctic, northern Canada, and
Siberia. Boeing, Polar Route Operations, AERO, Oct. 2001, at 10, 12, available at
http://www.boeing.com/commercialaeromagazine/aerol16/polar-route-ops.pdf. All other
continents and oceanic areas have significant levels ofjet traffic.
217.
Christopher Paul Barrington-Leigh, Fast Photometric Imaging of High Altitude
Optical Flashes Above Thunderstorms 1.2, (July 21, 2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University), http://www-star.stanford.edu/orals/index.html.
218.
See discussion supra Part lI.A.
ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supra note 39, para. 5e.
219.
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induced turbulence near Omaha, Nebraska. 220 The flight was at 39,000 feet
and the crew had received a preflight forecast of potential light to moderate
turbulence from between the altitudes of 20,000 and 38,000 feet. 2 2 1 Air
Traffic Control and other flights in the region were not reporting any turbulence at 39,000 feet. 222 The turbulence encounter was short-lived but relatively serious and resulted in an injury to a flight attendant.223 Consider the
knowledge the crew had before encountering the turbulence: forecasted
potential for up to moderate turbulence, but only at altitudes below their
present flight level, no current reports of turbulence at their flight level, and
the flight was currently operating in smooth conditions at 39,000 feet.224
The National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the accident
concluded that the probable cause of the accident was the inadvertent en-

counter with unforecast mountain wave turbulence.2 25 Without a more reliable method to predict and detect turbulence, aircraft will continue to encounter bumps and bounces of varying degrees of which they have no reasonable means to detect or avoid. Regardless of the advances in technology,
it is as yet impossible to predict or detect all turbulence or the severity of
that turbulence.2 26 Until turbulence is one hundred percent predictable, there
will always be available to an airline the argument that the cause of the injury was not in its complete control. This would make an instruction of res
ipsa loquitur inappropriate for a jury to consider, as the elements of res ipsa
loquitur have not been fulfilled and the air carrier has most likely met its
requirement of providing the "highest standard of care." Until turbulence is
completely predictable then, there is always the explanation that a turbuNational Transp. Safety Bd., Docket Management System (2007), available at
220.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/ (enter CHI06LA099 into the "Accident Number" field; then follow "submit query" hyperlink) (date of occurrence Wed. Mar. 15, 2006).
221.
Id.
222.
Id.

223.
224.

Id.
Id.

225.
National Transp. Safety Bd., Docket Management System (2007) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/ (enter CHI06LA099 into the "Accident
Number" field; then follow "submit query" hyperlink) (date of occurrence Wed. Mar. 15,

2006).
226. As direct evidence of this, while in the process of writing this Comment, the
author was involved in moderate turbulence while flying over the Amazon basin on a moonless night. The flight flew through the top of a dissipating thunderstorm that was not visible
due to lack of lightning activity within the storm and lack of any ambient light with which to
see the clouds. Nor was the storm detectable on airborne radar. Radar was not able to detect
the storm due to the lack of moisture content in the storm at that altitude-a phenomenon of
equatorial storms known as "dry tops." UNITED AIRLINES FOM, supra note 28, ch. 31 § 10.9.
There is not sufficient moisture within the storm from which the radar energy can be reflected back to the radar receiver. Thankfully, no one was injured, but the seat belt sign was
off and passengers and flight attendant crew were moving about the cabin.
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lence injury occurred in the ordinary course of events with no negligence on
the part of the airline.
As the Missouri Supreme Court considered whether res ipsa loquitur
should apply to turbulence injuries in Cudney v. MidcontinentAirlines, Inc.,
it wondered, "is it possible ... to say that it is now the common experience
of mankind that commercial airliners do not suddenly lurch and drop in
flight and then resume their course without mishap except through failures
to exercise due care? ' 227 They determined that such a conclusion is not reasonable because "it appears now to be common knowledge ... that downdrafts, which vary in effect according to their extent, are not uncommon. It
of nature, like the weather, is commonly
is true that such a manifestation
228
referred to as an act of God.,
B.

NOT APPLYING RES IPSA LOQUITUR RARELY LIMITS INJURED
PLAINTIFFS FROM RECOVERING DUE TO AIRLINE NEGLIGENCE

There is a scarcity of cases in the past twenty years that address res
ipsa loquitur as a negligence theory for airline liability for turbulence injury
to passengers. There appear to be several possible reasons for the lack of
recent consideration of res ipsa loquitur. First, the number of turbulence
injuries has decreased significantly. 229 The airlines are doing a better job of
preventing turbulence injuries through a variety of means and therefore
there are fewer suits. Second, injuries that do lead to litigation are frequently resolved before trial. Mediated settlements are much more popular
than they used to be and that is preventing suits from getting to a jury where
res ipsa loquitur would arise. Lastly, suits that do get to a jury have sufficient evidence of specific acts of negligence that the jury is prevented from
considering res ipsa loquitur to apply negligence to the airline.230
Most of the cases discussed in this Comment date from the 1950s and
1960s. One of the more recent considerations of res ipsa loquitur was issued
in 1991.231 In Karuba v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the court considered the defendant airline's motion for summary judgment and in the process discussed whether the plaintiff may rely on res ipsa loquitur to find negligence
on the part of the airline.232 Relying on the same authority discussed previously, the court held that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable because a jolt
227. Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Mo. 1953).
228. Id. at 667.
229. See McCartney, supra note 7.
230.
See discussion supra Part lI.D. 1 (noting that there are jurisdictions that do not
allow res ipsa loquitur to be considered when there is evidence of specific negligence).
231.
Karuba v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 1455, 1991 WL 51093, *1
(S.D.N.Y. April 3, 1991).
232. Id. at *2.
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to an aircraft from unexpected air currents does not create negligence on the
airline's part.233 The court granted summary judgment to the airline because
the plaintiff had no evidence of specific negligence and could not prove that
the crew could have reasonably foreseen the turbulence. 3 It appears that
the absence of res ipsa loquitur from being readily available to plaintiffs is
not preventing them from bringing action for injuries due to turbulence if
there is truly negligence present.
V.

CONCLUSION

The question posed in the introduction to this discussion was that
given advances in the aviation industry regarding turbulence, should res
ipsa loquitur be an acceptable theory of negligence on the part of an airline
for injuries passengers incur as the result of turbulence encounters? As the
discussion points out, the answer must still be no.
There have been marked and rapid advances in technology that allow
airlines and forecasters to determine in advance where turbulence will be
encountered. Advances in radar technology allow both air traffic controllers
and pilots to know well in advance where thunderstorm turbulence is likely
to be. Improved modeling and forecasting techniques allow meteorologists
and airline dispatchers to predict where clear air turbulence will occur and
allows them to route flights around the worst cases. Air traffic procedures
such as RVSM and SLOP allow for more flexibility in routing and altitude
selection giving flight crews more options to avoid known areas of turbulence. Federal regulations and airline policies have matured and changed
with increased knowledge of how best to prevent passenger injuries when
turbulence cannot be avoided.
In spite of all of these advances in turbulence prediction, detection,
avoidance, and mitigation, there is still no absolute way to know when and
where all turbulence will occur, or to prevent every injury. Improvements
continue, but until all turbulence is detectable in sufficient time to protect
passengers, it will be difficult for an injured passenger to show that an airline was in complete control of the situation that caused the passenger's
injury. As long as the airline can show it provided the highest degree of
care, the passenger will likely find it difficult to recover by an argument
that res ipsa loquitur should be accepted to show the airline's negligence in
a turbulence injury.
In 1950, a law review article was written asking this same question
and discussing the propriety of using res ipsa loquitur to prove airline neg-

233.
234.

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3.
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ligence. 235 The answer then, as now, was that res ipsa loquitur was not an
appropriate method to prove airline negligence. Perhaps in another fifty
years technology will have improved to the point where the next article to
ask the question will be able to answer yes.
ANDREW R. LOEFFLER*

Gatlin, supra note 195, at 874.
235.
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